WHETHER FIDEL CASTRO is sick, dead, or almost dead, the post-Fidel era has already begun, just in time for his 80th birthday on August 13. And while they may be honking horns and dancing in the streets of Miami, a sober look at Cuba suggests keeping the champagne on ice. Havana does not yet resemble the Prague or Berlin of 1989. Should Fidel’s “temporary” health sabbatical become permanent, he still will have left office on his own terms. And the Cuban dictatorship will survive–for now.
Its new boss, most assume, will be Fidel’s younger brother Raúl, the longtime defense minister who was anointed “interim” president by his big brother last week. Yet, as of August 4, Raúl Castro had not been seen in public. Many suspect he is courting top military officials and gauging their allegiance. As Cuba expert and former CIA officer Brian Latell has written, “The military is the most powerful, competent, and influential institution in Cuba.” Indeed, “they take in about 60 percent of tourism revenues and two thirds of hard currency retail sales.”
Those are the chief means–tourism and hard currency from abroad–by which Fidel kept his revolution afloat in the mid-1990s, after the loss of his Soviet patron. He had little choice. Food shortages, blackouts, and a dire economic crisis had sparked violent unrest. Following riots near the Malecon boardwalk in August 1994, Castro unleashed a flotilla of refugees, allowing thousands of Cubans to sail for Florida on flimsy rafts and rickety boats. This helped quell the turmoil, and it also led to the Clinton-Castro migration accords, which obliged America to grant some 20,000 Cuban visas a year.
But there was a catch: Castro got to pick the emigrants. This lets him divide families and then pocket money from remittances. He has also used the policy as a safety valve to squelch dissent. Many of the pro-democracy dissidents still in Cuba are inspiring, even heroic; Oswaldo Paya and Marta Beatriz Roque come to mind. But they belong to rival factions and often feud, especially over the U.S. embargo and Paya’s Varela Project, which calls for change within the post-1959 constitution. (Last spring, Paya snubbed the first meeting of Roque’s Assembly to Promote Civil Society in Cuba.)
Human rights activists are also still reeling from a 2003 crackdown that banished several dozen to prison. It is possible that the democrats, whose ranks are heavily infiltrated, may someday coalesce into a formal opposition with seats in parliament. But for now, the dissident movement remains tiny and fractious. The proximate threat to a Raúl-led dictatorship may come from reformist Politburo and State Council members, or perhaps maverick military officers, who are ready to extinguish Castroism for good.
For all we know, there could be Boris Yeltsin-type figures tucked away in the Cuban government. Under Fidel they could not speak out for fear of reprisal. Now they might. It’s also worth noting a paper released by the Clinton administration in the mid-1990s, which held that the Cuban military was a potential source of reform. The senior generals, such as Abelardo Colome Ibarra and Alvaro Lopez Miera, may stay loyal to Raúl. But what if others are ambitious for power? One thing is fairly certain: Should there be what Latell dubs “a Tiananmen Square scenario,” orders for a civilian massacre could split the military, and might spell the end of Raúl’s government.
Roger Noriega, formerly the top U.S. diplomat for Latin America, thinks a Raúlista regime could collapse within “months.” Raúl is widely despised in Cuba for his ruthless ways and utter dearth of charisma. Not for nothing did he earn the nickname “Raúl the Terrible” while befriending Che Guevara, carrying out executions, and preaching hardline Stalinism in the 1950s and ’60s. He is also a well-known alcoholic, with health woes that may include cirrhosis of the liver. At 75, he might be overwhelmed by the trials of holding together post-Fidel Cuba.
But let’s assume he hangs tough. Directly below Raúl, several true believers will be jostling for influence. They include Ricardo Alarcon, 69, president of the National Assembly; Felipe Perez Roque, 41, the foreign minister; and Carlos Lage, 54, the State Council vice president. Noriega predicts Raúl will establish a “troika” with Alarcon (“the face of the regime”) and Perez Roque. Lage is “probably outside that troika” but still important.
What then? Will Raúl prove an ideological chameleon, ready to embrace the Chinese template of market economics and authoritarian politics? Or will he prove as rigid as Fidel? Will he conspire with Venezuela’s Hugo Chávez to subvert Latin American democracies? How will he treat the Yanquis? And what happens to the U.S. embargo?
By now there seems little doubt that Raúl is sympathetic to the Chinese model. But that may not mean less repression. After all, Deng Xiaoping’s relaxed policies spawned the protesters in Tiananmen Square. Should Cuba take that risk?
To improve the lot of the Cuban people, yes. To revive the island’s desiccated economy, yes. But the regime has other lifelines, namely, Venezuela and China. Havana receives an estimated 80,000 to 100,000 barrels of crude oil each day from Caracas, some of which it sells for hard currency. Its second largest trading partner is Beijing. “Oil rigs along Cuba’s northwest heavy oil belt boast Chinese flags,” reported the Financial Times last March. Meanwhile, “Cuba’s ports are being revamped with Chinese equipment, in part, to handle millions of Chinese domestic appliances that began arriving last year.” Combined with tourism, remittances, and European trade, these revenue streams may help stabilize Cuba during its transition. And as long as Chávez keeps pumping petroleum, Havana will support his vision of leftist agitation across Latin America.
Where does that leave U.S. policy? Predictably, Democrats have renewed their calls for ending sanctions unilaterally. Just one problem: The 1996 Helms-Burton Act prohibits lifting the embargo until Cuba goes democratic. Simply replacing Fidel with Raúl won’t work. Arizona Republican Jeff Flake says he will introduce a House bill next month with Massachusetts Democrat Bill Delahunt that seeks to repeal portions of Helms-Burton. Flake would scrap the whole embargo if he could.
Others, mainly Cuban Americans and conservatives, say the embargo is now more crucial than ever. It may be our only viable carrot to induce progress toward democracy. President Bush shares this view. He hopes to crank up dissident aid (by $80 million) and set up a permanent platform to prevent jamming of America’s Radio and TV Marti broadcasts into Cuba. He may also reevaluate U.S. visa policy.
“It’s the first time in 47 years that we have a real comprehensive plan to deal with Cuba,” says GOP congressman Mario Diaz-Balart. If Raúl goes wobbly, or if a future Cuban regime genuinely seeks to normalize relations, the plan might even work.
Duncan Currie is a reporter for THE WEEKLY STANDARD.
