The Obama Administration’s defacto anti-ISIS partnership with Tehran is helping Iran’s Quds Force Commander Qassem Soleimeni and Ayatollah Khamenei “Finlandize” Iraq. Not only does this damage U.S. interests in sustaining an independent and sovereign Iraq, but the Obama Administration’s apparent acquiescence to Iran’s regional hegemonic ambitions undermines U.S. strategic interests and threatens our partners in Jerusalem, Ankara, Riyadh, and elsewhere in the Gulf.
It would be one thing if Tehran’s behavior had moderated. It hasn’t. Iran’s ambition, malign behavior, and strategic endgame remain inimical to broader American interests. Tehran has stoked the flames while benefiting from the disorder in both Iraq and Syria. Iran’s dominance over Beirut, Damascus, and Baghdad has only increased through its strategy of fomenting upheaval, disorder, and violence — and then coming to the “rescue.” And now Tehran’s strategy is having success with the Iranian-sponsored Shia Houthis taking over parts of Yemen.
From 2003 to 2011, Tehran played a duplicitous, complex, and cunning game, working through Shia proxies and at times enabling Sunni extremists to destroy the U.S. effort in Iraq. Tehran’s strategy in Syria has been to destroy the moderate opposition as a viable alternative, while ignoring — and at times supporting — the growth of Jubat al Nusra and ISIS. Even today, Tehran supports Sunni Islamic extremists by orchestrating the Syrian military response to attack moderate opposition and avoid fights against ISIS.
Meanwhile, U.S. policymakers rationalize that their options are constrained by Iranian “red lines” in Syria, because Tehran has made it clear that Iraq-based U.S. Forces are in effect hostage. Today, Tehran threatens U.S. deployed personnel with impunity as they have clearly learned from past experience in directing their proxies to kill Americans in Iraq that the U.S. will not strike back.
Tehran’s influence and power in Iraq has gained dramatically while the U.S. is increasingly seen as a hesitant and peripheral player –a willing accomplice to enhancing Tehran’s sphere of influence. Tehran has the natural advantages of proximity, deep knowledge of the players and environment, and a committed, ruthless leadership. All of the players understand that Iran will always be there.
The U.S. has capability but no political will to seriously take on the fight against ISIS. Therefore, partnering with Tehran on counter-terrorism has been suggested by NSS staffers as the “smart” and practical short-term solution to the regional ISIS challenge. This strategy only avoids hard choices about the future of President Assad and limits serious engagement in Iraq. The result of an insufficient military operation is political theater designed primarily for domestic political purposes, rather than rolling back ISIS or supporting regional partners and containing Iranian expansion. The most recent U.S. declaration about an upcoming Mosul offensive, later recanted, was a maladroit effort to create an impression about upcoming actions against ISIS. It was plainly designed to blunt criticism of the Administration’s weak response to ISIS.
The Administration’s ISIS strategy is almost certainly only a cover to obfuscate larger objectives of broader Iranian rapprochement and the political prize of a Washington-Tehran nuclear deal. Tehran’s terror network and web of proxy Shia warriors extends from Lebanon to Afghanistan to Yemen — with Shia militia and now Iraqi Shia Popular Mobilization Units (PMUs) declaring their mission to be the liberation of the Shia in the Gulf. Unfortunately, the current U.S. policy feeds the ISIS narrative that the U.S. is not only fighting Sunni Islam, but also that the West is in alliance with Tehran.
Furthermore, the regional perception of a U.S.-Tehran anti-ISIS compact alienates and increases insecurity in Tel Aviv, Ankara, Amman, Cairo and Riyadh. This can only create the prudent response of frayed alliances and security partnerships, and when Iran moves closer to nuclear threshold status, expect regional nuclear proliferation.
