THERE’S SOMETHING ALLURING about flying in a private jet, even if you’re sitting backwards, crammed alongside other reporters. Maybe it’s because you walk directly onto the tarmac, up the stairs to the Lear, no lines and no need to remove your shoes. Maybe it’s the leather chairs and wood paneling. Or maybe it’s the free scotch and Snickers bars. Not that I imbibed on the 9:00 a.m. flight to Owego, New York, courtesy of Lockheed Martin. (You would think the largest defense contractor in the world could afford a Gulf Stream. Or a stealth bomber.) Still, it was a treat–and the only thing Lockheed wanted was a story praising the US101 as the helicopter best suited for the president of the United States.
Not that the case couldn’t be made. During our trip last October to Owego, home of Lockheed’s Systems Integration facility, communications director Michael Drake explained that with the US101’s three engines, “you have a choice of where to land. With two, you have to land immediately.” In addition, the US101 is battle-tested: Its Royal Marine equivalent, the EH-101, has been serving honorably in Iraq. Said Stephen Ramsey, vice president and general manager of the US101, “What you don’t want to offer is a helicopter that is unproven.” Officials dubbed it an “Oval Office in the sky.” When it comes to systems integration, Lockheed is arguably the best.
So why would you choose anything else?
Two months after the trip to Owego, I was flown to Stratford, Connecticut, home of Sikorsky Aircraft, the long-time maker of the president’s current helicopter. We flew on a luxurious Hawker 800, which offered more space than the Lear. “The key,” said a British journalist, “is if you can stand up in the aisle.” (You can.)
Could Stratford exist without a Sikorsky? It’s hard to imagine, what with some 6,000 employees working there. Besides their own Marine One prototype–the VH-92–Sikorsky builds the Blackhawk helicopter, a staple of U.S. presence in Iraq. Touring their plant, it’s hard to miss the American flags, proudly hanging on the walls and in the hangars. There’s a plaque honoring factory employees who are on active duty in the Middle East. The message is clear: Shouldn’t the president of the United States fly in an American-made helicopter? Would the president drive around in a Mercedes?
INDEED, only 65 percent of the Lockheed model is American. The other 35 percent comes from Italy and Great Britain (AgustaWestland). In a post-9/11 environment, Sikorsky makes a valid argument as to whether the gearboxes and rotor blades manufactured abroad will be as secure as something made here. Many Sikorsky employees (though not all) have “Yankee White Clearance”–meaning top secret access, which British and Italian workers lack. Besides which, the aircraft has other merits, which program manager Nick Lappos (himself a veteran helicopter pilot) explains impressively. The VH-92 is an outgrowth of the Blackhawk, which has logged more than 7 million flight hours, he says. Also, three engines are actually a burden on the lift, resulting in less payload and less range–and besides that, with either two engines or three, if something is damaged, you land regardless. And while the US101 claims to be longer, the VH-92 is wider.
IN THE EARLY MONTHS of the competition (known as VXX), Sikorsky Aircraft officials stressed the “Made in America” aspect, while Lockheed maintained that VXX was about getting the best helicopter, not the most American. “Which is the better helicopter?” asked Lockheed’s Stephen Ramsey. “Our competitor wants to divert attention away from that and talk about how American they are. Frankly we think the first question ought to be ‘Shouldn’t the president have the best helicopter?'” And besides, “If our key allies are good enough to shed their blood, sweat, and tears with us on the battlefield, why isn’t the product of their industrial labor good enough for our president?”
Sikorsky insisted that long before the “Buy American” argument was made, their rivals were politicizing the issue at a much deeper level. To wit, a letter sent to President Bush in January of 2003 that read in part:
I understand that you intend to accelerate the replacement of your Marine Corps Executive Transport helicopters. I wanted to draw your attention to the significant capabilities offered by the US101 helicopter for this role . . . . With many thousands of flying hours behind it, the US101 is a low risk solution with the additional safety and security provided by the latest technology (including U.S. defensive measures) and three engines . . . . I hope that you will be able to look favorably on this proven “off the shelf” product.
Yours ever,
Tony
The “Tony” in question is one Prime Minister Tony Blair.
LAST DECEMBER, when Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi and President Bush met with the press, a member of the Italian media (who some suspect was a plant) asked if the two men discussed the contest for Marine One. Said Berlusconi, “Italian helicopter is almost completely made, manufactured in the United States . . . . I can only say that I’ve been flying these helicopters for 30 years and I’m still here.” Bush ended the meeting, saying “The prime minister brought up the issue. I’m very familiar with it. . . . I’m very aware of the joint venture. I understand the nature of U.S. jobs that will be created in this venture, and I assured him the venture will be treated fairly.”
Two leaders integral to Bush’s coalition of the willing were making an unprecedented lobbying effort for a U.S. government contract bid. “You want to talk political?” scoffed a Sikorsky representative.
When the government’s decision was postponed until after the presidential election, insiders saw it as a good sign for Lockheed–awarding the $1.8 billion contract to a partially European venture would have led critics to charge the president with turning his back on 9,000 American jobs–he was outsourcing Marine One! When the Defense Acquisition Board announced a decision would be made at the end of January, prior to Bush’s visit to Europe, others speculated this also benefited Lockheed since there was no way the president would go to Blair and Berlusconi empty-handed. But just before January 28th, an Italian newspaper claimed to have sources saying the winner of the bid was Sikorsky.
The winner was, in fact, Lockheed/AgustaWestland. According to John Young, assistant secretary of the Navy, “The Lockheed streamlining proposal was selected because it was judged more likely to meet . . . government requirements on schedule, with lesser risk, and at a lower cost.”
SECRETARY YOUNG’S ANNOUNCEMENT set off a firestorm, mostly through a flurry of press releases: Connecticut senator Joseph Lieberman called the decision “outrageously wrong. It insults Sikorsky’s workers and management, who earned the right to build the president’s helicopter. As I said from day one, our commander in chief should fly in the very best helicopter made in America–and the only one that meets that standard was Sikorsky’s.” His counterpart in the House, Democrat Rosa DeLauro, suggested the Navy’s strategy was “short-sighted and deeply flawed.” She continued, “In awarding this contract not to Sikorsky but to Lockheed Martin–a company that has never been in the business of making helicopters–the administration has shown that it has no faith in American business or American workers.” Duncan Hunter, the Republican chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, was equally incensed, saying “it is difficult to understand why we would use U.S. tax dollars to fund development of foreign helicopter technology.”
On the other side, Senator Hillary Clinton said she “can attest that it will serve the president well . . . . the US101 truly represents the best that New York and America have to offer.” Citizens Against Government Waste applauded the decision. Said CAGW president Tom Schatz: “Taxpayers avoided what could have been another helicopter sinkhole had Sikorsky won the contract. Twenty years ago, Sikorsky’s Comanche seemingly had it all: dazzling graphics, wide political support and great promise. However, the helicopter never materialized; $8 billion later, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld mercifully discontinued the project . . . . Thankfully, DOD learned its lesson and chose not to head down the same expensive and ultimately fruitless road.”
Douglas Harpel, the Washington correspondent for Defence Systems Daily and president of Aerospace Intelligence, a Washington-based consulting firm, offered this assessment: “Sikorsky, offering a variant of its spanking new S-92, decided to play the ‘All-American’ card early and often. The trouble was, as the Navy noted last week, the competition came down to schedule, risk, and price, with national origin not registering. Proven performance meant more than promised performance; ‘made in quantity’ meant more than ‘made in America.'”
For Sikorsky, the next few months are vital. They’ve recently lost the Comanche and Marine One. If they lose this summer’s bid for the Air Force’s Personnel Recovery Vehicle, what will happen to the company and its employees? True, Sikorsky continues to thrive on the Blackhawk and the larger CH-53X Super Stallion. But losing a prestige contract and billions of dollars in research and development is a serious blow. Sikorsky called the Marine One competition “a must-win” and many presume that now the company’s president Steve Finger will have to step down.
“But would the president really kill Sikorsky?” asked another trade writer. In other words, in the interest of protecting the dwindling U.S. military-helicopter base, a compensation contract would need to go to Sikorsky. Which might leave Lockheed wondering if they really won at all.
Victorino Matus is an assistant managing editor at The Weekly Standard and a contributor to the blog Galley Slaves.
