Additional Views

DEVASTATING. CRITICAL. SCATHING. Those are just some of the adjectives used to describe the report on prewar Iraq intelligence by the Senate Intelligence Committee. I’d like to add another: Hilarious.

Okay, not the whole report. But the “additional views” section contributed by the committee’s vice chair, Senator Jay Rockefeller (Rockefeller was joined in his view by Senators Carl Levin and Richard Durbin):

The Bush Administration’s case against Iraq was largely based on the argument that we knew with certainty that Iraq possessed large quantities of chemical and biological weapons, was aggressively pursuing nuclear weapons, and that an established relationship between Baghdad and al Qaeda would allow for the transfer of these weapons for use against the United States. This national security rationale being put forth publicly by senior administration officials in support of regime change in Iraq was simple, direct and often fundamentally misleading.

Perhaps Rockefeller, et. al. had in mind a categorical argument like this one.

There is unmistakable evidence that Saddam Hussein is working aggressively to develop nuclear weapons and will likely have nuclear weapons within the next five years. And that may happen sooner if he can obtain access to enriched uranium from foreign sources–something that is not that difficult in the current world. We should also remember that we have always underestimated the progress Saddam has made in development of weapons of mass destruction . . . But this isn’t just a future threat. Saddam’s existing biological and chemical weapons capabilities pose a very real threat to America, now. Saddam has used chemical weapons before, both against Iraq’s enemies and against his own people. He is working to develop delivery systems like missiles and unmanned aerial vehicles that could bring these deadly weapons against U.S. forces and U.S. facilities in the Middle East. . . . [emphasis added]

Thank you, Jay Rockefeller, who spoke those words on October 9, 2002, in explanation of his vote to “authorize the use of force if necessary.”

In their recent report, Rockefeller and friends charge the Bush administration with language far too “hyperbolic and urgent.” You see, “the qualifications the Intelligence Community placed on what it assessed about Iraq’s links to terrorism and alleged weapons of mass destruction programs were spurned by top Bush Administration officials, early casualties in the war with Iraq.”

The first example?

The danger to America for the Iraqi regime is grave and growing . . . Delay, indecision, and inaction are not options for America, because they could lead to massive and sudden horror.
(President Bush, radio address, October 5, 2002)

That criticism is awfully hard to square with this line from Rockefeller’s floor speech, just four days later: “The president has rightly called Saddam Hussein’s efforts to develop weapons of mass destruction a grave and gathering threat to Americans.”

Among the lines from President Bush singled out in Rockefeller’s “additional view” was this one:

And as I have said repeatedly, Saddam Hussein would like nothing more than to use a terrorist network to attack and to kill and leave no fingerprints behind.
(President Bush, remarks with Prime Minister Blair, January 31, 2003)

That argument doesn’t sound too different from this one, which Rockefeller included in his impassioned floor speech, delivered four months earlier.

And he could make those weapons available to many terrorist groups which have contact with his government, and those groups could bring those weapons into the U.S. and unleash a devastating attack against our citizens. We cannot know for certain that Saddam will use the weapons of mass destruction he currently possesses, or that he will use them against us. But we do know Saddam has the capability.

Or, for that matter, this one from the same speech:

Some argue it would be totally irrational for Saddam Hussein to initiate an attack against the mainland United States, and they believe he would not do it. But if Saddam thought he could attack America through terrorist proxies and cover the trail back to Baghdad, he might not think it so irrational.

The “additional view” from Rockefeller and friends cites this line from President Bush as an example of Bush administration exaggeration:

Facing clear evidence of peril, we cannot wait for the final proof–the smoking gun–that could come in the form of a mushroom cloud.
(President Bush, Speech in Cincinnati, October 7, 2002)

And yet Rockefeller echoed those concerns in his floor speech two days later:

As the attacks of September 11 demonstrated, the immense destructiveness of modern technology means we can no longer afford to wait around for a smoking gun.

SOME OF THE REPORT’S other “additional views” are not merely hypocritical–they’re inaccurate:

Not until September 2003, a half-year after the start of the Iraq War, did the President state in clear, unequivocal terms the Intelligence Community position that [sic] was no evidence supporting such a link between Iraq and the murderous acts of al Qaeda on September 11th.

On January 31, 2003, some six weeks before the war, reporters from Newsweek asked President Bush if Iraq was involved in the September 11 attacks:

Bush, asked Friday about a 9-11 connection to Saddam, admitted, “I cannot make that claim.”

In one very important respect, Rockefeller’s language went well beyond that of the Bush administration:

There has been some debate over how “imminent” a threat Iraq poses. I do believe that Iraq poses an imminent threat, but I also believe that after September 11, that question is increasingly outdated. It is in the nature of these weapons, and the way they are targeted against civilian populations, that documented capability and demonstrated intent may be the only warning we get.

And while Rockefeller now insists that he based his decision to vote for the war on inadequate intelligence–something no one disputes, given the intelligence failures outlined in the rest of the Intelligence Committee’s report–there was a time when he demonstrated little patience for those wanting to know more:

To insist on further evidence could put some of our fellow Americans at risk. Can we afford to take that chance? We cannot!

Rockefeller has said in recent days that had he known then what he knows now, he would not have voted in favor of the Iraq War resolution. And he deserves credit for such candor. One hopes that the leaders of his party–John Kerry and John Edwards–will follow his example.

But his attempts to blame the Bush administration for making the same arguments he made–based on the same intelligence–is, well, hilarious.

Stephen F. Hayes is a staff writer at The Weekly Standard. Parts of this article are drawn from his new book, The Connection: How al Qaeda’s Collaboration with Saddam Hussein has Endangered America (HarperCollins).

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