Pressure is building to send American military forces outside of Kabul’s airport in order to extricate U.S. citizens and Afghan allies from elsewhere in the city.
I understand the concern to get as many at-risk allies to safety as soon as possible. Still, the risks entailed in operations outside of the airport are underestimated. Yes, there are unconfirmed reports that British and French special forces are recovering personnel from the city. But I strongly suspect this activity is far more limited than is assumed. These movements likely involve the recovery of only the very highest-value or at-risk assets, such as former intelligence agents.
Regardless, a U.S. military recovery effort outside the airport would carry a number of considerable risks.
First off, there’s the capability challenge.
While the United States now has approximately 7,000 Marines, paratroopers, and special operations forces at Hamid Karzai International Airport, those forces do not have anywhere near a commensurate armor or ground transport capability. Moving forces around Kabul would not be easy. It would mean navigating narrow, poorly maintained roads. It would mean tense encounters with Taliban checkpoints.
U.S. forces would also face a considerably higher threat than British or French forces. That’s because of the Taliban’s particular animus for America and the higher symbolic value of an attack against America. Either at senior command or local command levels, Taliban officers would be tempted to see U.S. operations outside of the airport as an intolerable challenge to their victory.
In turn, any outside-the-wire endeavors would necessarily entail a very significant force protection effort. That would mean diverting helicopter gunships, drones, and strike aircraft away from the airport, increasing the airport’s vulnerability. And just as U.S. ground convoys would risk ambush, isolation, and annihilation, gunships would risk engagement from Taliban ground forces. What if a convoy became lost or stuck? What if a gunship was shot down?
Welcome to the Battle of Mogadishu, part two.
Air cover for a mobile ground force is also much more complicated than the defense of a static position such as Kabul airport. The ground force couldn’t simply rely on persistent air cover as it passed through Kabul’s streets. It would need air controllers to direct air cover with a high degree of speed and accuracy. Slow-moving drones could do some of this work, but their number is limited.
Operating above crowded streets is very different from patrolling an airfield perimeter. One miscalculation or mistake might result in a civilian residence being blown up instead of an al Qaeda ambush team. On that point, even if the Taliban assessed the risks of engaging U.S. forces as excessive, it might decide to use proxy forces to achieve the same effect, albeit with a pretense of deniability. (This is already a rising U.S. concern at Kabul airport.)
There’s another risk to consider. What if the convoys were swarmed with civilians?
Considering the desperate scenes at the airport, it seems plausible that many of Kabul’s 4.5 million population might take any opportunity to escape the Taliban’s rule. What happens if a convoy becomes surrounded and stuck amid a crowd of thousands? How does the U.S. military recover its personnel without using force against those civilians? Again, would the Taliban, al Qaeda, or the Islamic State seek advantage from the situation?
Top line: While some extractions of high-value personnel have likely been secretly carried out by U.S. special operations forces, significant risks attach to larger-scale operations outside the airport. The better alternative is for President Joe Biden to offer the Taliban a binary choice: allow access to the airport to all U.S. and Afghan persons eligible for evacuation, or face a persistent U.S. military presence at the airport beyond Aug. 31. The airport can be defended.
