Should the United States Congress impose additional economic sanctions on Russia?
To most Republicans and Democrats on Capitol Hill and to much of the foreign policy establishment in Washington inside and outside of the U.S. government, the question is so ridiculous that it hardly warrants a serious response. The answer inevitably comes down to an “of course, why wouldn’t we?”
With everything the Russians have done over the last three years, from its annexation of the Crimean Peninsula and its continued violation of the Minsk agreements in Ukraine to its active measures campaign during the 2016 U.S. presidential election — not to mention all of the shady financial dealings, government corruption, and human rights abuses that help solidify Vladimir Putin’s hold on power — Moscow has certainly deserved the indignity of being casted as a bad actor. The U.S. Senate wouldn’t have passed a comprehensive Russia sanctions amendment last month on a bipartisan and overwhelming 98-2 vote if there wasn’t some basis for further restricting the Russian economy.
But what if the sanctions bill that the Senate passed, which is currently stalled in the House, is too tough? So tough, in fact, that it would severely handicap President Trump’s ability to strike a deal with Russia at some point in the future?
This isn’t a theoretical or academic query. Indeed, it’s exactly what the White House is concerned about. Marc Short, Trump’s legislative affairs director, has been making the rounds in Capitol Hill offices and speaking with House leadership to register the administration’s complaints about the bill — the first being that it encroaches on the president’s ability as the chief executive to make deals with the Russians in any number of areas.
And guess what? The Trump administration is right.
When Marc Short and other administration officials argue that the Russia sanctions bill “sets an unusual precedent of delegating foreign policy to 535 members of Congress,” he’s partly correct. Short is wrong that it’s an unprecedented move by Congress; just ask President Barack Obama, whose Iran nuclear agreement had to survive a congressional resolution of disapproval process before coming into effect. But he’s right that members of Congress, in attempting to exert their own constitutional authority on matters of foreign policy, are decreasing Trump’s flexibility.
Before the administration can terminate any sanctions on the Russians, the bill first requires the president to submit a report to Congress explaining what sanctions he hopes to remove. After that report is submitted, the House and Senate are both provided the opportunity to pass a resolution of disapproval blocking the president’s termination of those sanctions, a normally-tough ask in a highly-divided Washington but one that may be easier given all of the anti-Russia invective in the halls of Congress.
You can see why the White House would be concerned. The legislation would in effect hold Trump at the mercy of Washington politics at any given time. That doesn’t exactly fare well for any negotiation, let alone one with the Russians.
There is no doubt whatsoever that Trump would like to sit down with Putin eventually and attempt to wheel-and-deal him. U.S.-Russia relations are in the cesspool; Secretary of State Rex Tillerson and Trump himself have both acknowledged it. From the standpoint of great power relations, having such a terrible relationship between the world’s two largest nuclear powers is not a great thing for global stability. So any concessions that Trump or his national security advisers can wring out of the Russians to make the relationship a little more predictable (provided they are good-enough concessions, of course) should be welcomed, not scorned.
Unfortunately, the bill as it’s currently drafted would make even a discussion about a negotiation difficult to achieve.
One doesn’t have to be a pro-Trump acolyte to at least understand why the administration wants this bill amended. Any president, Republican or Democrat, would be unable to swallow this pill without fighting back.
Daniel DePetris (@DanDePetris) is a contributor to the Washington Examiner’s Beltway Confidential blog. He is a fellow at Defense Priorities. His opinions are his own.
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