The U.S. government fears that Iranian forces or proxies will attack U.S. interests on or around Sunday, Jan. 3. That date is the first anniversary of the U.S. military strike that killed Qassem Soleimani.
An Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps general, Soleimani commanded that organization’s covert action wing, the Quds Force. In turn, Soleimani’s assassination sparked fury among the hard-liner elite who hold ultimate authority over Iran’s foreign policy. They want to avenge Soleimani with the spilling of American blood in some significant way. To counter that threat, the United States has made repeated public announcements in recent weeks of U.S. military deployments proximate to Iran. Concerns that Iran will target Secretary of State Mike Pompeo after the Trump administration leaves office have also led to an extension of Pompeo’s protective detail.
Still, the particular concern at present is twofold.
First, there’s the strategic consideration that the first anniversary of Soleimani’s death will be one that Iran wishes to mark. As with the annual Ashura memorial celebrations of Shia martyr Husayn ibn Ali, the centrality of anniversaries to Iran’s Khomeinist ideology cannot be understated. Ayatollah Ali Khamenei would thus perceive a successful attack on U.S. interests on or around Jan. 3 as both a vindication of his pledge to see Soleimani avenged and as a signal of Iran’s ability to project military power at times and places of its choosing. He would hope that such an attack would broadcast the enduring strength of the Islamic revolution.
Next, there’s the tactical consideration of Iran’s deployment of military resources to proxy forces in Iraq. As the Washington Post notes, Iranian Quds Force commanders have been in physical contact with their Iraqi proxies. This has included the delivery of more sophisticated weaponry to those proxies. Alongside other intelligence reporting, it now appears likely that an attack plot has been developed and is ready for activation. U.S. concern is focused on the security of U.S. Embassy personnel in Baghdad. This is partly due to the Quds Force’s significant operational reach inside Iraq, but also due to Iran’s hope that any U.S. retaliation might be taken against Iranian interests in Iraq rather than Iran (a perception that the Trump administration should be keen to dissuade). And as an extension, that any U.S. retaliation inside Iraq would undermine the improving relationship between Baghdad and Washington.
In short, an imminent Iranian attack on U.S. interests is likely.
