Donald Trump provided some much-needed clarity about his plan for Afghanistan in a speech to the nation on Monday. The United States won’t be withdrawing anytime soon. We won’t announce in advance our departure dates. We’re not doing nation-building. Afghan security forces will be the offensive lead in the fight against terrorists. Pakistan faces real consequences if leaders there continue to play both sides in this 16-year war.
Such clarity is welcome and some of what Trump announced has the potential to change the dynamics of the U.S. effort in South Asia. The warning to Pakistan, if Trump is prepared to follow through on his threats, will be the most significant war-on-terror policy development to emerge from this young administration.
Still, there are many reasons for skepticism and many outstanding questions.
Why will we have “victory” in Afghanistan with one tenth of the troops in-country than we had at the height of our war there? Will increasing U.S. troops from roughly 10,500 to 14,500 have a real impact on fighting, particularly if most of those troops are there only in a train/assist/advise capacity? Will the Trump administration be willing to confront Russia for its support of the Taliban? Will the United States end the crucial “core facilitation pipeline” that Iran provides to al Qaeda, even if doing so risks a military confrontation with Tehran? Will we go after the Taliban chain of command in Pakistan?
And there is one question even more important than these that the Trump administration appears confused about: What do we do with the Taliban?
On that question, the Trump administration seems badly divided. Top White House national security officials are deeply skeptical of negotiations with the Taliban. The same is true for many senior Pentagon warplanners. But others in the administration consider the Taliban a potential partner for peace, just as the Obama administration did.
Hours before Trump’s speech, a U.S. official told Fox News Pentagon correspondent Jennifer Griffin that the administration was open to negotiating with the Taliban. Griffin, one of the best defense reporters in the country, tweeted: “Trump strategy to include negotiating w/ Taliban. In past Qatar negotiations failed b/c Pres Obama announced troop withdrawals: US official.”
White House talking points distributed before the speech seemed to confirm this approach. “There is room for a political settlement between the Taliban and the Afghan government that would result in the Taliban stopping its violent campaign, repudiating terrorism, and supporting the Afghan constitution, including its protections for women and minorities. The path to a peace agreement will be difficult, but the Taliban has no path to victory on the battlefield.” The “ultimate goal” of U.S. efforts in Afghanistan, according to these talking points: “a peaceful settlement between the government of Afghanistan and the Taliban that protects our interests.”
All of which makes it sound like the Taliban is an essential partner for peace.
Yet the bullet point immediately before suggests that the United States considers the Taliban a terrorist organization: It says, the United States “will support the Afghan government and security forces in their fight against Taliban, al-Qaeda, ISIS, and other terrorist groups to prevent the establishment of terrorist safe havens in the country.”
And in his remarks to the country, Trump seemed pessimistic about diplomacy with the Taliban. “Someday, after an effective military effort, perhaps it will be possible to have a political settlement that includes elements of the Taliban in Afghanistan, but nobody knows if or when that will ever happen. America will continue its support for the Afghan government and the Afghan military as they confront the Taliban in the field.”
Adding to the confusion, secretary of State Rex Tillerson seemed to commit the Trump administration to the same kind of diplomatic tail-chasing that was a priority of the Obama administration’s failed approach in a statement he made after the speech: “We are making clear to the Taliban that they will not win on the battlefield. The Taliban has a path to peace and political legitimacy through a negotiated political settlement to end the war. We stand ready to support peace talks between the Afghan government and the Taliban without preconditions.”
The Taliban with “political legitimacy”? Negotiations “without preconditions”? This is absurd. In their outstanding piece on how the Trump administration can avoid the mistakes of its predecessors in Afghanistan, Tom Joscelyn and Bill Roggio pointed to the need for the Trump administration to be serious about the nature of the Taliban:
Joscelyn and Roggio further argue that U.S. efforts to separate the Haqqani network from the Taliban—and both of them from al Qaeda—are misguided:
At least one U.S. official seems to understand the folly of treating the Taliban as anything other than a terrorist enemy. In remarks in Australia in June, secretary of Defense James Mattis said that the Taliban would not be part of any political solution in Afghanistan:
Trump was clear that America will not withdraw from Afghanistan and he sent an unmistakable message to Pakistan that its double-dealing must end. Those were important and welcome messages. But the administration’s confused language on the Taliban undercuts the president’s otherwise resolute message on the way forward in South Asia.
